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I. SCOPE OF ENGAGEMENT AND REPORT 
1. At the request of Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., I submit this review and 
evaluation of the Expert Report of Kevin F. Dages ("Dages" individually or 
"Dages Report") submitted on July 29, 2016. This report should be read in 
conjunction with my Expert Report filed on July 29, 2016 ("Marcus Report") and 
all capitalized terms herein are consistent with the definitions in the Marcus 
Report. 
2. I submit this report in accordance with rules of the Court of Chancery 
of the State of Delaware. The analysis and opinions contained herein are based on 
information available as of the date of thjs report. I reserve the right to supplement 
and/or amend this report should any additional information become available. The 
professional fees for my services are not contingent upon the outcome of this 
matter or the opinions expressed herein. In addition to the documents and other 
information I relied upon in preparing the Marcus Report, the list of documents 
and other information I relied upon in performing my analysis set forth below is 
attached to this submission. This report presents a summary of my methodologies, 
findings, and conclusions. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DAGES REPORT 
3. The Dages Report attempts to paint a bleak picture of the WLAN 
market generally, and Aruba' s prospects specifically, including its ability to remain 
1 
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independent and the supposed impending departure of CEO On. In doing so, the 
Dages Report fails to acknowledge Aruba's record-breaking actual performance in 
Q2 2015 (in both revenues and margins), growing market share, the positive 
statements made by Aruba's management to the public and internally, and the 
positive view held by many analysts covering the Company at the time. Further, 
while attempting to cause the reader to infer a need to sell the Company based on 
this negative outlook combined with leadership transition issues, the Dages Report 
provides no evidence that the Company was for sale ptior to it being approached 
by HP, that Orr would abandon the Company and put his substantial equity stake at 
risk, or that management or the majority of analyst shared similar concerns about 
Aruba's future at the time. In fact, the median security analyst PT increased from 
$24.00 to $26.00 after Aruba released its Q2 2015 financial results (see Exhibit 1) 
and the increase in the PTs was not, for the majority of the analysts reviewed, 
based on the rumor of an HP acquisition of Aruba as Dages asserts. Finally, Dages 
identifies no reason to believe that the contemporaneously prepared February 2015 
Proje,ctions did not incorporate management's and the Board's expectations for 
Aruba. 
4. Dages claims to rely on a DCF model usmg the February 2015 
Proje,ctions in calculating a $19.85 per share fair value of Aruba as of May 18, 
2015. Dages, however, makes two inappropriate adjustments to the February 2015 
2 
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Proje·ctions and relies on a series of inconect assumptions that lead to a valuation 
lower than almost all contemporaneous indications of value, including the DCF 
analyses performed by the investment bankers charged with advising both Aruba 
and HP. Further, Dages assumes that a "robust" sales process led to a transaction 
value that, when reduced for synergies he believes were included in the offer price, 
supports his calculated fair value. Dages's analysis fails, however, because he 
ignor·es the serious process problems and conflicts of interest that existed at the 
time. Finally, Dages relies on other indications of value that, when appropriately 
analyzed, do not support his conclusions. 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE DAGES REPORT'S DCF ANALYSIS 
A. THE DAGES REPORT'S CRITICISM OF THE FEBRUARY 2015 
PROJECTIONS IS UNJUSTIFIED 
5. Dages argues that the February 2015 Projections were overly 
optimistic because the projected growth rates contained in those projections 
exceeded industry growth rates projected by Dell'Oro Group as of December 31, 
2014. 1 However, as shown in Exhibit 2, Aruba consistently had grown at a rate 
exceeding the industry average in the years preceding the Valuation Date. In 2014, 
the last fiscal year completed prior to the transaction, Aruba's revenues grew 
approximately 21.5%, about double the rate of industry growth. Furthermore, for 
1 Dages Report at 39-41. 
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the fust quarter of calendar 2015, IDC reported enterprise WLAN growth of 3.0% 
year over year. 2 Aruba, in contrast, experienced revenue growth of 20.1% 
(excluding its OEM business) over this same comparison period. 3 Under these 
circumstances, the fact that the February 2015 Projections exceeded the average 
industry growth rate does not provide a valid basis to label those projections as 
overly optimistic. 
6. Dages also claims that the February 2015 Projections were optimistic 
because the WLAN industry was competitive, the WLAN industry was 
consolidating, and the Company projected reduced SBC going forward was too 
low. 4 Dages's reliance on information predominantly from 2014 causes his 
analysis to be outdated and irrelevant as of the valuation date. His failure to 
consider data from 2015 is particularly troubling here, given Aruba's rapid 
historical revenue growth rate and its record setting Q2 2015 revenues and profit 
margins. Among other things, cutting off his analysis at the end of the 2014 fiscal 
year allows Dages to suggest that Aruba's share of the enterprise WLAN market 
2 IDC Press Release, Worldwide WLAN Market Shows Slowed Growth in First 
Qua1ter of 2015. 
3 "Aruba (excluding its OEM business) was a major bright spot in a weakened 
1 Q 15, increasing 20.1% year over year .. . " (IDC Press Release, Worldwide WLAN 
Market Shows Slowed Growth in First Quarter of2015). 
4 Dages Report at 4-5, and 46-47. 
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was 11.8% (where it stood in Q4 2014),5 when in fact it had risen to 14% by the 
end ofQ12015,6 as shown in the table below : 
Aruba's Share ofthe Worldwide WlANMarket 
Q~ 2013 Q4 2013 Ql 2014 Q2 2014 Q~ 2014 ()4 2014 Q l 2015 
9.5% 9.8% 12.0% 11.7% 11.5% 11.8% 14.0% 
Source: IDC Worldwide Quarterly WLAN Tracker. 
7. Finally, Dages provides no basis to believe that the February 2015 
Proje,ctions did not, in fact, reflect Aruba management's and the Board's honest 
assessment of the Company's financial and business prospects at the time. For 
example, in Aruba's second quarter 2015 earnings call, which took place on 
February 26, 2015, Orr stated: 
"In conclusion, we continue to be excited about the size and growth 
fundamentals for the wireless LAN market, particularly as we move 
through the calendar year. Furthermore, our strong operational 
execution and ability to leverage our key growth drivers are enabling 
us to grow faster than the overall market. We continue to see the 
conversion cycle to [sic] towards .llac is the growth driver for many 
quarters to come ... "7 
8. In fact, the February 2015 Projections were adjusted downward from 
the October 2014 Projections at the time of the merger discussions to reflect 
5 Dages Report at 4. 
6 See IDC Press Release, Worldwide WLAN Market Shows Slowed Growth in 
First Quarter of2015 ("Aruba's market share jumped to 14.0% compared to 11.8% 
in 4Q14 ... ")(cited in Dages Report at ,-r9). 
7 Aruba Networks, Inc. FQ2 2015 Earnings Call Transcripts, S&PCapital IQ, 
February 26, 2015, p. 5 
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management's and the Board's contemporaneous view of the Company's 
prospects, including, but not limited to, the revenue growth rates (including lower 
backlog), estimates of profitability, SBC, and others. For example, Galvin 
explained "how [the Company' s] revenue projections were created as part of the 
three year plan": 
"A: Okay. Okay. The formula- I guess you could call it a formula-
would be - we have very closely looked at the amount - in terms of 
revenue, it would be the bookings incoming and then it would be 
the amount of backlog the company had and what the conversion 
possibilities of that backlog is. And so we looked very closely at and 
tracked what were known as "weeks of backlog," ... so I guess it 
would be bookings, as the leading indicator, and then an 
evaluation of backlog to say, you know, is the backlog an 
appropriate, healthy enough state to where we be·lieve we can get 
revenue conversion out of the bookings for the next quarter of two 
quarters. "8 
9. Aruba's Board also exhibited confidence in the February 2015 
Proje·ctions by providing the revised projections to HP9 and instructing the Board's 
financial advisors to rely on those projections when evaluating the proposed 
Transaction.10 
8 Galvin Dep. at 27- 28. 
9 Johansson Dep . at 201 (HP used February 2015 Projections as "one set of data 
points" in its analysis). 
10 See generally Reisenberg Dep. at 161-165 (Evercore was provided the February 
Proje·ctions as they appeared in the proxy and confirmed that it would base its 
financial analysis on these projections per Aruba's request). See Galvin Dep. at 
274-275 (the Company sent the February 2015 Projections to Qatalyst), and 
Boutros Dep. at 139-141 (Galvin to update Qatalyst's cash flow template for 
6 
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B. ANALYSIS OF KEY VARIABLES 
1. Dages Inappropriately ReJects Management's SBC 
Projections 
10. The Dages Report rejects the projected level of SBC developed by 
Aruba's management and included in the Proxy 11 and adopts instead projected 
SBC for Aruba that was included in a financial model prepared by Barclays for 
HP.'2 
11. Months before the Valuation Date, Aruba had implemented and 
publicly disclosed business plans to reduce the Company's SBC as a percentage of 
revenue to bring Aruba's SBC practices more in line with those of its 
competitors. 13 Aruba management provided projected SBC to its financial advisors 
that reflected these plans to reduce SBC going forward. 14 Dages rejected those 
implemented business plans. 
revised projections). See also ArubaAA0443864 (Galvin Ex. 42; Boutros Ex. 
20)("Post receiving the updated management plan, we will input the new figures in 
the cash flow template ... "). 
11 Proxy at 57. 
12 Dages Report at 47. 
13 For example, see Email from Dominic OIT, Subject: Focal Reviews, June 25, 
2014 (ArubaAA0054934). Galvin Dep. at 132 - 138; ArubaAA0054933 (Galvin 
Ex. 17); 2014 10-K, p. 48.; and Q4 2014 Earnings Call Transcript, August 26, 
2014, p. 6. 
14 Galvin Dep. at 299-304. 
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12. Dages explains that he rejected Aruba' s SBC projections because "I 
think it is unreasonable to assume that Aruba would be able to retain and motivate 
an employee base sufficient to fuel the projected excess revenue growth while 
cutting its SBC percent of sales in half" 15 Dages's stated basis for rejecting 
management's SBC forecast is unsupported and factually misplaced. The 
Company' s plans to reduce SBC were implemented well before the February 2015 
Proje,ctions were created, 16 and Dages provides no basis to believe that any 
potential ramifications from that decision were not incorporated by Aruba 
management (who would have a superior understanding of Aruba' s business than 
Dages) into the February 2015 Projections themselves. Further, Dages provides no 
evidence that reducing SBC as a percentage of revenues in fact would prevent 
Aruba from attracting and retaining quality professionals, particularly when 
Aruba' s SBC forecasts were designed to bring the Company's SBC practices more 
in line with the industry. 17 
15 Dages Report at 47. 
16 For example, see ArubaAA0054933 (Galvin Ex. 17); and 2014 10-K, p. 48. 
17 ArubaAA0054933 Galvin Ex 17 (6/25/ 14 Orr email to Aruba managers 
announcing SBC changes; "We have historically been at the very top of all 
comparable companies in granting equity to Olllr employees. In years past we' ve 
granted more than two times the amount of stock to our employees as compared to 
comparable companies in our space."). 
8 
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13. Further, the Barclays projections Dages relies on are not relevant in 
analyzing Aruba as a standalone company. Explaining Barclays's financial model 
of Aruba, and SBC in particular, Hardegree testified as follows: 
"Q: Is there a reason why you would pick to expense it [SBC] through 
the P&L versus using the dilution factor? 
A: Because that's the way they [HPJ were going to run the business. 
This whole case has nothing to do with how Aruba would run its 
business on its own. This is how does HP think, okay, as a business 
unit within HP-- how do we figure out what this is going to be 
incremental to us. So it's a totally different basis of presentation."18 
14. In fact, Hardegree, testified that he had no idea where Barclays's SBC 
projections came from. 19 
15. Where the record evidence explains that Barclays's projections 
"ha[ ve] nothing to do with how Aruba would run its business on its own" and does 
not identify the source or basis of Barclays' s SBC projections or how those 
projections were created, it is not sound valuation practice to rely on those 
projections in determining a fair value of Aruba as a going concern as of the 
Valuation Date. 
18 Hardegree Dep. at 208-209, emphasis added. 
19 Hardegree Dep. at 254 ("Q .... On the DCF Analysis Aspen Management Case, 
there is a line that says 'Stock-based Comp,' and it has various figures. Do you 
know where those numbers came from? A. I do not."). 
9 
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16. Holding all other factors constant, using SBC projections included in 
the Barclays model instead of Aruba management's SBC projections reduces the 
fair value of Aruba as determined in my opening report by $5.20 per share. 
2. Dages Inappropriately ReJects the 25°/o Tax Rate that 
Aruba Management Provided to the Company's Financial 
Advisor and Ignored Valuable Net Operating Losses 
17. Dages also rejects the Company's effective tax rate of 25% as 
disclosed in the Proxy and used in Qatalyst' s fairness opinion. 20 Instead, Dages 
adopts a tax rate of 30%, which he derived from a February 4, 2015 Excel model 
d d . d" 21 pro uce m 1scovery. 
18. Dages's rejection of the 25% tax rate is inappropriate because Aruba 
CFO Galvin testified that Aruba management provided Qatalyst with the 25% cash 
tax rate figure used in the projections and their rnodel.22 
19. Dages also ignores the fact that the Company had a net operating loss 
("NOL") carryforward that it could use to offset taxable income. Galvin testified 
that the Company had NOLs that it could use over the next two to three years (i.e., 
through 2017). 23 In fact, in preparing their valuation work, both Qatalyst and 
20 Proxy at 51. 
2 1 ArubaAA005346l.xlsx "Athens Cash Flows'~ (excel file). 
22 Galvin Dep. at 296. 
23 Galvin Dep. at 156. 
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Evercore utilized a nominal 4% tax rate for 2015E and 2016E.24 Dages uses the 
30% tax rate across the entire projection period, effectively ignoring the valuable 
NOLs.25 
20. Holding all other factors constant, ignoring Aruba' s NOLs and using a 
30% tax rate instead of the 25% tax rate that Aruba management provided to its 
financial advisors reduces the fair value of Aruba as determined in my opening 
report in the amount of $1.88 per share. 
3. Dages Inappropriately Omits a Transition Period Necessary 
to Normalize Earnings Growth 
21. The projection period used in a DCF model, particularly one that 
employs a perpetual growth rate in the terminal value calculation, should reflect 
the time it takes for the subject company to reach a steady state. Reaching a steady 
state of cash flow before calculating a terminal value is well established in 
academic literature. One frequently cited valuation text, for example, explains as 
follows: 
"Note that the only reason one would use a discounted cash flow 
method as opposed to a capitalized cash flow model is that the subject 
company predicts a period of variability in its earnings stream for 
some period of time into the future. The appropriate length of the 
forecast period should be until that variability stops; at the point in 
24 For example, see Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for Discussion, 
March 2015, p. 18 (ARUNOOOllO); and Evercore, Project Athens, Suppmting 
Valuation Analysis, March 1, 2015, p. 12 (EVERCOREOOOl 0297) 
25 Dages Report at 51 and Exhibit 19C. 
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time that the company expects normalized or level growth, the 
terminal value is calculated."26 
22. Dages relies on a two-stage DCF model, stating "I determine that 
modeling a third stage was not sufficiently warranted as there was no investment or 
change to the operations that needed to be explicitly modeled."27 Dages is wrong. 
23. At the end of the projection period in the February Projections, the 
Company's revenue was projected to grow at 10%. It would be unreasonable to 
assume that the Company in its steady state could continue to grow at the 10% 
rate. It is well recognized in valuation literature and referenced in the Dages Report 
that a likely cap on a company's long term growth rate is the long term growth rate 
of the economy, measured as nominal GDP for companies with domestic 
operations.28 Regardless of whether the long term growth estimate is the 3.5% 
used in my report or 2.75% used in the Dages Report, a drop off in revenue growth 
rate from 10% to below 4% is inappropriate. This situation, where the year five 
growth rate is well above the long term projected nominal GDP growth rate, 
requires an intermediate stage in the projections to reduce the growth to a 
stabilized long term level. 
26 Pratt, Shannon P. and Alina V. Niculita. Va]uing a Business: The Analysis and 
Appraisal of Closely Held Companies. 5th Edition. The McGraw-Hill Companies, 
2008, pg.219 
27 Dages Report 41-42. 
28 Dages Report at 48. 
12 
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24. Dages provides no reasonable basis to believe that m year 2020, 
Aruba's revenue growth could be expected to drop from 10% to 2.75%. Dages's 
rationale for excluding a third stage to the model is: 
stage. 
" .. . given the fact that the Management Projections are already 
projecting growth well in excess of the overall industry, adding a third 
stage to the forecast would arguably add more uncertainty to the 
growth forecast. Such hyper growth assumptions get more 
problematic the further you move away from the three year period that 
management forecasted in the ordinary course of business."29 
25. This rationale provides no reasonable basis for not including a third 
26. First, Dages inappropriately describes the projections as only being 
three years. While the base projection started with the Company's three-year plan, 
both Galvin30 and Boutros31 testified that Aruba management was involved in 
completing the full five year forecast provided in the Proxy and used in the 
Qatalyst fairness opinion. 
27. Second, the Company was projecting growth above the industry 
average, consistent with its last four years of history and its market leadership 
position. It is thus my opinion that it is less risky to gradually reduce the 
29 Dages Report at 42. 
30 Galvin Dep. at 163-64. 
31 Boutros Dep. at 58-59. 
13 
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projections utilizing a third stage than to project that the Company's revenue 
growth rate would fall off of a cliff in year five, as modeled in the Dages Report. 
28. Holding all other factors constant, failing to use a transition period to 
normalize revenue growth rate reduces the fair value of Aruba as determined in my 
opening report by $1.88 per share. 
4. Dages Inappropriately Selects an 11 °/o WACC 
29. In developing his opinion on Aruba's value of $19.85 per share, 
Dages utilized an 11% discount rate. 32 I utilized a 10% discount rate to value 
Aruba. 33 The central difference in our calculations relates to the beta utilized in the 
CAPM modee4 I calculated Aruba's WACC using a beta generated by weighting 
Aruba's company-specific two-year weekly beta with the beta of comparable 
WLAN and pure-play networking companies identified by Aruba' s financial 
32 Dages Repmt at 58. 
33 Marcus Report at 83 . 
34 Dages and I agree that the foilowing inputs are proper: (1) use of Aruba's 
existing capital structure (1 00% equity) to calculate an appropriate discount rate 
such that the WACC is equal to the Company's cost of equity (Marcus Report at 
79; Dages Report at 50); (2) use of the CAPM model to calculate the cost of equity 
(Dages Report at 51 ; Marcus Report at 80); (3) use of a 2.75% risk free rate (Dages 
Report at 52; Marcus Reporrt at 80); and ( 4) use of supply-side equity risk 
premiums (Dages: 6.21%; Marcus: 6.19%) (Dages Report at 52; Marcus Report at 
80). 
14 
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advisors. 35 In contrast, Dages presents a range of W ACCs using a variety of 
selected betas and then selects an 11% W ACC as the basis for his opinion. 36 
30. Exhibit 18 of the Dages Report summarizes the different betas he 
utilized to develop a range of possible discount rates for Aruba. In this Exhibit, 
Dages calculates W ACCs for Aruba as well as for a supposed peer group utilizing 
three different calculation periods/frequencies (namely, Bloomberg adjusted betas 
that were calculated on a two-year weekly, five-year weekly, and five-year 
monthly basis). Dages' s approach to selecting betas is flawed for several reasons. 
31. First, Dages inappropriately includes five-year betas, which merely 
serve to provide higher estimates of beta (causing the valuation to be depressed). 
Use of five year betas is inappropriate here because they are not representative of 
the Company's future risk as of the valuation date. As described in the Marcus 
Report and summarized here, the Company's growth, market success, and financial 
performance changed dramatically over the five years preceding the transaction, 
rendering the use of a beta calculated over a five-year period irrelevant for 
purposes of estimating Aruba's value as of May 18, 2015. 37 Dages argues for a 
variance from his normal practice of using 2-year weekly returns because "in 
35 Marcus Repmt at 80-83. 
36 Dages Report at 57-58 and Dages Report Exhibit 18. 
37 Marcus Report at 83. 
15 
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certain cases, a historical 2 year measurement window is distorted in a way as to 
not be representative of the risk of the business moving forward (e.g., a major 
acquisition or divestiture is announced)." 38 However, this argument actually 
describes why a shorter calculation period is superior to a longer calculation period 
in this situation where Aruba has changed so dramatically over the preceding five 
years. As explained in Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples (Fifth Edition) 
(identified as "relied upon" by Dages): "[I]f the business characteristics change 
during the sampling period (e.g., major divestiture or acquisition, financial distress, 
cancellation of a significant contract), it may be more appropriate to use a shorter 
sampling period."39 
32. Not only is Dages' s use of a five-year period to calculate Aruba' s beta 
inappropriate, but his use of both five-year weekly and five-year monthly betas 
artificially inflates his WACC calculation. By their nature, Aruba' s five-year 
weekly and monthly betas are similar. 40 Thus, by including both, Dages 
overweights the five-year period in his calculations. Using WACC estimates based 
on Aruba's adjusted two-year weekly and five-year monthly betas as reported in 
38 Dages Rep01t at 54. 
39 Pratt, Shannon P., and Grabowski, Roger J. , Cost of Capital: Applications and 
Examples Fifth Edition: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2014), p. 208. 
40 Aruba's five-year weekly adjusted beta is 1.41 and its five-year monthly 
adjusted beta is 1.46. Dages Report, Exhibit 18. 
16 
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Exhibit 18 of the Dages Report, the median (and mean) WACC for Aruba is 
9.99%. 
33. Dages's use of Bloomberg adjusted betas was also improper. 
Bloomberg calculates adjusted betas by weighting the company's observed beta by 
two-thirds and the market beta (1 .0) by one-third. 
34. Dages's use of the Bloomberg adjusted betas is not justified. As New 
York University Corporate Finance Professor Aswath Damodaran explained: 
"Why adjust betas towards one? The rationale can be traced to studies 
that indicate that, over time, there is a tendency on the part of betas of 
all companies to move towards one. Intuitively, this should not be 
surprising. Firms that survive in the market tend to increase in size 
over time, become more diversified and have more assets in place, 
producing cash flows. All of these factors should push betas towards 
one. 
Using constant weights to estimate these betas, however, does not 
make sense. The speed with which betas converge on one should vary 
across companies. Firms that tend to diversify more should see their 
betas converge on one far faster than firms which stay focused in one 
business. While conceding the fact that betas for most firms will move 
towards one over time, we would argue that there is no need to adjust 
regression betas towards one right now to reflect this tendency. 
Instead, the betas can change over time, in a valuation or a project 
analysis, to approach one over time."41 
35. Given that Aruba's focus was almost entirely on the WLAN market 
combined with the fact that the raw beta reflects the market's estimates at the time 
41 Damodaran, Aswath, "Estimating Risk Parameters," Stern School of Business, p. 
12. 
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of the valuation, it is my opinion that the adjusted betas that Dages used are 
inappropriate in the case of Aruba. 
36. Holding all other factors constant, using an 11% discount rate instead 
of the 10% W ACC I calculated reduces the fair value of Aruba as determined in 
my opening report by $4.23 per share. 
5. Dages Selects an Unreasonably Low Terminal Value 
Perpetuity Growth Rate 
37. The Dages Report book ends the stable growth rate in the terminal 
year to be in between the rate of inflation and the nominal United States GDP 
growth rate, presenting a range of 2.25% (median long-term inflation rate) to 
4.75% (the high end of the range for his estimated nominal GDP growth rate).42 
Relying on a single decision from this Court, without any explanation reconciling 
the similarities and differences between the subject companies at issue, Dages 
selects the risk-free rate, 2.75%, for his long-term growth rate. 
38. Dages's selection of his perpetuity growth rate does not take into 
account the expected long-tetm growth rate of the economy as suggested by 
academics and practitioners alike. For example, consider the following: 
"Growth rate: Few companies can be expected to grow faster than the 
economy for long periods. The best estimate is probably the expected 
42 Dages Report at 49 (Dages also presents an estimate ofGDP of 4.2%). 
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long-term rate of consumption growth for the industry's products, plus 
inflation. "43 
"As a point of reference, real (before inflation) gross domestic product 
has grown by about 3-3.5 percent per year since the 1920s. Since the 
discount rate and cash flow assumptions are in nominal terms (i.e., 
they include inflation), the growth rate also must be nominal. 
Therefore, a long-term growth rate would include the long-term 
inflation rate forecast as well as any real growth in earnings. (If long-
term inflation were expected to be 3 percent and if the real growth in 
earnings of a company were expected to be 3 percent, then this long-
term rate would be 6 percent.)"44 
39. A simple average of Dages's growth rate book ends ( 4.75% and 
2.25%) yields a long-term growth rate of3.5% (3.36% using the average of the two 
GOP growth rates). Given Aruba's historical and projected performance, its 
growing market share, and its industry leadership position, a long term growth rate 
at the higher end of that range of between 3.5% and 4.75o/o would be a reasonable 
expectation for the Company. Selecting a rate of 2.75% inappropriately penalizes 
Aruba's value. 
40. Holding all other factors constant, Dages's use of a 2.75% perpetuity 
growth rate has the effect of reducing the fair value as determined in my opening 
report by $1.92 per share. 
43 Koller, Tim, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation - Measuring and 
Managing the Value of Companies, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Fifth Edition, 2010, 
p. 214. 
44 Hitchner, James R., Financial Valuation- Applications and Models, John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., Second Edition, 2006, pp. 309-310. 
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C. CONCLUSION ON THE CRITIQUE OF THE DAGES REPORT'S DCF 
ANALYSIS 
41. The five maJor differences discussed above ((i) changing 
management's projection of SBC; (ii) changing management's projected tax rate; 
(iii) utilizing a two-stage DCF model as opposed to a three-stage model; (iv) using 
an inflated WACC; and (v) using a lower terminal year growth rate) account for all 
but $0.1545 of the: difference in the valuations of Aruba as calculated in the Dages 
Rep011 and the Marcus Report. 
42. Dages's valuation of Aruba is well below the Company's own 
expectations of value (see my initial report), well below the median analyst price 
targets (see Exhibit 1 ), below the low end of the range of the DCF analyses 
performed by the three financial advisors involved with the transaction (even if 
such analyses are not corrected for their inappropriate assumptions), and well 
below Aruba's own $25.00 per share ceiling on its stock repurchase program. 
45 The remaining difference between the DCF values reported in the Dages Report 
and Marcus Report results from a slight difference in the share count used ($0.05) 
and most likely rounding differences in attempting to replicate the Dages DCF 
($0.10). 
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43. The chart below demonstrates the cumulative impact of each of the 
five key differences discussed above, and provides a reconciliation of the fair value 










Marcus DCF Impact of Impact of30% Impact of2- Impact of II% Impac·t of Impact of Share Dages DCF 
Valuation Increased SBC Tax Rate Stage Model WACC 2.75% PGR Count& Valuation 
Rounding 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE DAGES REPORT'S OTHER INDICATIONS OF 
VALUE 
A. THE MERGER PRICE 
44. Dages opines that "[ o ]ne potential indicator of fair value is the merger 
price itself, particularly in situations where the target company was acquired in an 
46 The incremental impact of each of the key differences listed in the following 
chart do not necessarily equal the individual impact of adjusting each factor 
separately (identified above) because the incremental impact depends on the order 
in which adjustments are made. The following chart presents these differences in 
what I believe are the most logical order. 
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arms' length transaction subject to a robust sales process."47 But whether or not a 
transaction completed as a result of a robust sales process or on an ann's length 
basis (free of conflicts) can provide any indication of fair value is in·elevant here. 
Based on my analysis of the record, the sales process did not serve as a tool for 
price discovery, nor was it free of conflicts of interest. 
1. The Sales Process Did Not Lead to Price Discovery 
45. Aruba was not for sale at the time it received an unsolicited approach 
from HP. Upon the initiation of discussions with HP, Aruba's hired Qatalyst as its 
investment banker. Qatalyst had limited discussions with a small group of five 
potential strategic buyers in the fall of 2014 and later with a sixth in January 2016. 
The process, however, did not provide any price discovery regarding Aruba's value 
other than the price negotiated with HP. Ther,e are a number of reasons why the 
merger price is an unreliable indication of Aruba' s fair value under the facts here. 
46. First, the price negotiated with HP cannot be relied upon as a market 
check of Aruba's value. HP offered what it was willing to pay, but did so with a 
belief that there was not any competition. As described by Johansson: 
"[F]rom the time that Antonio reached out to Dom, at least from our 
perspective, it was a very friendly discussion. It was - they were not 
47 Dages Report at 23. 
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running a sales process. There was no posturing about trying to pin us 
against someone else. "48 
4 7. The lack of any actual or even perceived competition did not provide 
the auction-like environment viewed by many, including Aruba, as the best 
environment to maximize price.49 And for its part, beyond the obvious incentive to 
minimize its purchase price, HP had the additional concern that it not be perceived 
as overpaying given that its acquisition of Aruba was its first major acquisition 
since it was forced to write-off $8.8 billion approximately 11 months after 
acquiring Autonomy in December 2011.50 Moreover, Johansson testified that the 
price HP was willing to pay was based on what Aruba was worth to HP, and not on 
any analysis of what Aruba was worth as a going concem on a standalone basis. 51 
Therefore, reliance upon HP's purchase price of Aruba as an indication of fair 
value is inappropriate. 
48 Johansson Dep. at 112. 
49 For instance, at least as early as September 22, 2014, Aruba discussed the need 
to have a "stalking horse" involved in order to make the process more competitive. 
Email from Aaron Bean to Dominic Orr et al. , Subject: News Observations, 
September 22, 2014 (ARUN005500). 
50 Johansson Dep. at 128; Whitman Dep. at 102 ("I remember pointing out to him 
that this was the first deal post the Autonomy acquisition and that there was going 
to be heightened inspection, heightened thoughtfulness about the first deal post 
Autonomy, and that, you know, he was going to feel that pressure in terms of the 
pace at which we moved and the amount of board oversight and things like that."); 
ARUN009606 (Orr Ex. 46). 
51 Johansson Dep. at 29, 38. 
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48. Second, the process undertaken by Qatalyst did not provide any price 
discovery. None of the limited group that Qatalyst contacted52 ever got to the 
position of discussing price because they were not interested in Aruba for strategic 
reasons. Boutros testified that "[i]t was very clear that none of them had any 
interest in an acquisition. It wasn't a close calL It was unequivocally no. No 
interest. This is not a company we' re interested in buying or owning."53 And 
because of this lack of strategic interest, Boutros's testimony confirmed that this 
limited reach-out did not provide any means of price discovery: 
"A. When someone is really interested strategically in an asset but 
they struggle with the price, they tell you that. When you call people 
and they say, 'This is really not something we want to own because 
it's not on our strategic roadmap and this is not a company that 
belongs in our company,' it has nothing to do with price. Price 
doesn't even come up in the equation. 
Q. Okay. 
52 It should also be noted that while Dages also describes Orr reaching out to 
Google Access and Dell (Dages Report at 19), the Company apparently did not 
consider this effort by Orr to be significant as it was not disclosed in the Proxy. 
Under these circumstances, Orr's contacts should not be considered part of a 
market check. And, in any event, Orr testified that both Google Access and Dell -
like the others contacted by Qatalyst - were not interested in Aruba for strategic 
reasons. Orr Dep. at 175-177 (Google Access told Orr that it did not "have interest 
to attack the general market" and therefore did "not have interest in your 
company"; after meeting with Dell, Orr' s "best judgment" was that Dell would be 
"much more focused on the storage business" and thus would not have interest in a 
networking acquisition). 
53 Boutros Dep. at 219. 
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A. And that was the case with all [of} these potential acquirers 
when we spoke with them. "54 
49. Third, the small number of potential buyers contacted also ratses 
questions regarding the adequacy of the efforts to solicit alternative bidders. 
Qatalyst informed the Aruba Board that the five potential buyers it was petmitted 
to contact in the fall of 2014 likely would not be interested in an acquisition, 55 and 
there is indication in the record that other potentially interested parties were not 
contacted. 56 
50. If the potential buyers contacted had no interest in Aruba for strategic 
reasons and never provided a price indication as a result, the mere fact that they 
were contacted does not provide any suppmi for price discovery. 
51. Finally, all financial sponsors were eliminated from the process. 
Regardless of the price limitations in the LBO model as described by Dages, once 
the targeted strategic buyers declined for strategic reasons, there was no reason to 
exclude potentia[ financial sponsors from the process in order to gain price 
54 Boutros Dep. at 220 (emphasis added). 
55 Boutros Dep. at 75-76. See also Boutros Dep. at 99-100; and 219. 
56 For example, in a March 4, 2015 email from Hans Vestberg of Ericsson (a 
potential strategic buyer) to Quattrone, be wrote "Congratulations to [sic] the deal, 
we were a little puzzled why you did not include us in the process, or maybe you 
did?', (Email from Hans Vestberg to Frank Quattrone, "RE: Qatalyst Advises 
Aruba Networks on Proposed $3.0 Billion Sale to HP," March 4, 2015 
(QP00011637)). 
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discovery or generate competition to the HP offer. In fact, Qatalyst was 
contemporaneously advising Riverbed Technology, Inc. ("Riverbed") in its sale to 
private equity investors Thoma Bravo LLC ("Thoma Bravo") and the Ontario 
Teachers' Plan Board ("Ontario Teachers") in a transaction that both Qatalyst and 
Evercore included in their comparable transaction analyses. 57 Excluding financial 
sponsors from the entire sales process, particularly in light of the process's failure 
to generate any interest in Aruba, contributed to the process's failure to generate 
any price discovery. 
52. Because the process in this situation never provided any pnce 
discovery, the results of the process provide no information about Aruba's value 
other than what HP was willing to pay. Given these circumstances, it would be 
inappropriate to rely on the price negotiated between Aruba and HP as an 
indication of Aruba's true intrinsic value. 
57 On December 15, 2014, Thoma Bravo and Ontario Teachers offered to acquire 
Riverbed in a transaction valued at $3.4 billion. Riverbed provided solutions for 
fundamental problems associated with performance across WAN s. Information 
discussing the Riverbed transaction was obtained from FactSet, unless otherwise 
noted. 
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2. Conflicts of Interest 
53. Dages states that "I have seen no evidence indicating that the 
transaction was not done at arms' length."58 Dages ignores myriad conflicts of 
interest that existed. 
(a) Qatalyst Conflicts 
54. From the outset, Aruba recognized that Qatalyst had a vested financial 
interest in getting the transaction done with HP, regardless of whether the deal was 
in the best interest of the Company. 59 In fact, there is evidence that Aruba' s Vice 
President of Human Resources believed that Qatalyst wanted Aruba to close a deal 
with HP to the exclusion of other potential acquirers. 60 
55. Qatalyst also had a conflict unique to HP specifically, arising from its 
prior representation of Autonomy. This conflict was exacerbated when Whitman 
refused to negotiate with Qatalyst and Aruba acceded to Whitman' s wishes and 
58 Dages Report at 23. 
59 Email from Dominic Orr to Ava Hahn, Subject: Re: One Page Summary, 
September 25, 2014 (ARUN001504) ("I want to highlight there is a subtle but 
important split in objectives between Qatalyst and Aruba .. . viz. they only have 
one objective in mind - sell aruba at the highest premium but sell it! We have two 
additional objectives: that, other than financials, the combination makes 
substantial sense (we need this to continue to motivate our staff), and that the 
organization and structure is set up for success and maintaining fun and pride and 
minimize large company pain."). 
60 Email from Aaron Bean to Dominic Orr et al. , Subject: News Observations, 
September 22, 2014 (ARUN005500). 
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brought in Evercore as a second investment banker. My opening rep01t details 
extensive facts in the record documenting this conflict, including Whitman 's 
refusal to negotiate with Qatalyst, Quattrone's r,epeated efforts to appease Whitman 
and protect the Qatalyst brand (which continued after the closing), and Aruba's 
efforts to clear Evercore' s retention with Whitman in order to negotiate a 
transaction.61 I will not repeat all of that evidence here, but instead incorporate it 
by reference. Dages ignores this evidence entirely. Throughout the course of my 
career, I have never seen a situation where the opposing side of a transaction had 
such jnfluence over the other side's choice of an investment banker. 
(b) Evercore Conflicts 
56. Dages also ignores evidence indicating conflicts within Evercore, 
which are also highlighted in my opening report.62 Evercore was motivated to take 
a steeply discounted advisory fee just to get its name on a transaction between HP 
and Aruba "to establish a presence in tech"63 and internally was looking to position 
6 1 Marcus Rep011 at 50-57. 
62 Marcus Report at 58-61 . 
63 Email from Ava Hahn, January 24, 2015 (ARUN004920 at ARUN004921). 
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itself to get future business from HP. 64 Again, I will not repeat all of that record 
evidence here, but incorporate it by reference. 
57. This evidence, set forth at length m my openmg report, provides 
substantial reason to doubt that Evercore operated free of any extraneous 
considerations in negotiating against HP for a price that reflected Atuba' s fair 
value. The importance to Evercore of securing a role in the Aruba/HP deal both in 
terms of solidifying the bank's presence in the tech sector and in terms of allowing 
it to build a potentially lucrative future relationship with HP and the importance to 
Francis personally to establish himself at his new employer all present conflicts to 
Evercore/Francis that Dages ignored. 
(c) Orr Conflicts 
58. Dages also ignores conflicts relating to CEO On. On October 2, 
2014, Aruba and HP signed a confidentiality agreement that prevented HP from 
talking to Aruba employees about positions in the new company. The record 
indicates that HP and Orr began discussions as early as September 2014 and 
continued to have such discussions after the confidentiality agreement was signed. 
It was not until February 18, 2015 when the Aruba Board agreed to amend the 
64 Email from Naveen Nataraj to Stuart Francis, Subject: Re: Evercore meeting at 
MWC/CEO Dinner at Can Roca, February 21, 2015 
(EVERCORE00007343)(That's HUGE! Meg is going to be very active. Am 
almost sure Lenovo will make a bid for the PC business post separation. Would be 
a great new relationship ... ") 
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confidentiality agreement that HP was permitted to talk to Aruba employees about 
employment in the newly combined business. 
59. Orr's discussions of his potential role as head of the combined Aruba 
and HP business while purportedly negotiating on behalf of the Company posed a 
clear conflict of interest. The fact that Orr did not retire, as the Dages Report 
suggests he was poised to do, makes clear how significant this conflict was, as the 
lure of a position with the post-closing Aruba was strong enough to derail 
retirement plans that (in Dages's view) were assured to come to fruition absent a 
transaction. 
60. The collective conflicts of interest among Qatalyst, Evercore, and Orr 
are sufficient to call into doubt whether the deal was done to maximize the ultimate 
share price paid to existing shareholders, therefore undermining Dages's 
assumption that the transaction was negotiated at arms' length. 
B. ANALYST PRICE TARGETS 
61. The Dages Report refers to security analysts PTs as being another 
indicator of Aruba's value. Dages centers his analysis on the Bloomberg article 
that reported the rumor that HP might be acquiring Aruba. Specifically, the Dages 
Report notes that the security analysts' PTs ranged from $19.00 to $29.00 per share 
(medjan of $22.00) prior to the Bloomberg report and ranged from $20.00 to 
30 
CONTAINS IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 
$34.00 per share (median of $26.00) after the Bloomberg report. 65 The Dages 
Report makes two fundamental errors in its analysis of security analysts PTs, 
which leads it to inappropriately rely on the analyst PTs as support for it fair value 
estimate. 
62. First, Dages states that the Bloomberg article reporting the rumor of 
Aruba being acquired by HP came out on February 27, 2015. This is incorrect. As 
noted in both the Marcus Report and the Proxy, the Bloomberg article was reported 
on February 25, 2015.66 This error in the Dages Report is significant because after 
the market closed on February 26, 2015, Aruba reported its record Q2 2015 
earnings. 67 Fallowing the Company's Q2 2015 earnings release, many analysts 
updated their Pis based not on the rumor of an acquisition as implied in the Dages 
Report, but based on the Company's operating metrics (see Exhibit 1 ). 
63. Further, the security analysts ' Pis are by definition the value for a 
minority share of the Company and are generally based on a twelve month outlook, 
not the fair value of the Company at the time of the report. If the median PT of 
$26.00 is discounted by 10% for a one-year period, and a 20% premium is added to 
65 Dages Report at 28. 
66 Proxy at 45; Marcus Report at 26. 
67 Proxy at 45; Marcus Report at 25-26. 
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the result in order to eliminate the inherent minority interest discount, the resulting 
fair value is $28.36 per share. 
64. When viewed properly, the Dages Report 's analysis of security 
analysts' PTs fails to support Dages's opinion on the fair value of Aruba. 
C. FINANCIAL ADVISORS' DCF VALUATIONS 
65. The Dages Report states that the valuation ranges provided by the 
three investment banking firms involved in the transaction support his $19.85 per 
share estimate of fair value. He is wrong. 
66. Dages derived his $19.85 per share value based on a DCF. In relying 
on Qatalyst, Evercore and Barclays, it is not until Dages adds in all other valuation 
methodology ranges used by these advisors (many based on "comparable 
companies or precedent transactions" that are not truly comparable) that his 
analysis provides a range that at its lowest end is slightly below his estimate of fair 
value. In order to make an appropriate comparison, Dages should only use DCF 
values to support his $19.85 per share DCF value. 
67. Now focusing solely on DCF valuations, Dages calculated Aruba's 
WACC at 11.0%. In regards to Qatalyst, Dages relies on Qatalyst's presentation to 
the Aruba Board when it provided its fairness opinion.68 In perfmming its DCF 
68 Dages Report at 29 c1tmg "Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for 
Discussion," March 2015 (ARUN000093-130). 
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sensitivity analysis, Qatalyst used discount rates of 10.50%~ 12.25% and 14.00%.69 
Even by Dages's own calculation, the 12.25% and 14.00% discount rates are too 
high for Aruba. Thus, using Qatalyst's 1 0.50o/o discount rate (being the closest to 
Dages's 11 %), Qatalyst presented a range of DCF values of $23.23 to $30.02 per 
share. This range does not support Dages's $19.85 per share opinion. 
68. In relying on Evercore to support his $19.85 DCF value, Dages used 
materials prepared by Evercore dated March 1, 2015. 70 In performing its DCF 
sensitivity analysis, Evercore used discount rates ranging from 11.0% to 13%.71 
Focusing on Evercore's 11.0%> discount rate as it is the same as Dages's discount 
rate, Evercore presented values of $26.65 to $29.78 per share based on a PGR 
method of determining the terminal value. Evercore also presented values of 
$26.13 to $29.75 per share based on an EBITDA multiple to calculate the terminal 
value. These ranges do not support Dages's $19.85 per share opinion. 
69 Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for Discussion, March 2015, pp. 24-
25 (ARUN000093-130). 
70 Dages Report at 31 citing "Project Athens Supporting Valuation Analysis," 
March 1, 2015 (EVERCORE00011411-32). 
7 1 Project Athens Supporting Valuation Analysis, March 1, 2015, p. 12 
(EVERCORE00011411-32). 
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69. Dages also relied on Barclays to support his $19.85 DCF value and in 
so doing, used Barclays February 27, 2015 board materials.72 In performing its 
DCF sensitivity analysis, Barclays used discount rates ranging from 11.0% to 
13%.73 Focusing on Barclays' 11.0% discount rate as it is the same as Dages's 
discount rate, Barclays presented values of $29.24 to $33.64 per share based on an 
EBITDA multiple to calculate the terminal value. This range does not support 
Dages's $19.85 per share opinion. 
70. As a final note and as discussed above, each of these financial 
advisors faced myriad conflicts that render rdiance on their DCF calculations 
inappropriate. Dages's analysis ignores these conflicts of interest entirely. 
D. COMPARABLE COMPANY ANALYSIS 
71. The group of seven 74 companies Dages selected is not sufficiently 
comparable to render his comparable compames analysis meaningful. The 
companies identified by Dages can be broken down into three categories: WLAN 
companies (including Ruckus Wireless, Inc. and Ubiquiti Networks, [nc.), Pure-
Play Networking companies (including F5 Networks, Inc.), and Traditional 
72 Dages Repmt at 32 citing "Project Aspen Board Materials," Febtuary 27, 2015 
(ArubaAA0519962). 
73 Project Aspen Board Materials, February 27, 2015, p. 10 (ArubaAA0519975). 
74 Ultimately, because Aerohive Networks, Inc. did not have meaningful trading 
multiples, Dages relied on six companies to make his assessment of value. 
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Networking companies (including Cisco Systems, Inc., Brocade Communications 
Systems, and Juniper Networks, Inc.). 
72. The comparability for valuation purposes of each of these companies 
to Aruba is weak Although I consider the group of WLAN companies to be the 
most comparable to Aruba, none of the WLAN companies selected by Dages have 
a product line as robust as Aruba' s. Consider, for example, the following table 
from my initial report which indicates what companies are considered leaders in 
various WLAN segments: 
Select Competitive Benchmarking 
- Indicates a Leader 
SMBGIM 
Wireless Fie ld Expertise 




Strategic lows try Par tnership> 
BYOD Solution 
Wireless Controller/ Features 
Fnte•·p ·ise Access Point 
Wired S\\itching 
Network Management Sofn,are 
Policy Management 
Tele"o•·ker/Remote Access Point 
Controller-less Access Point 
Clou~managed nehwrking 
HP II Aruba II Cisco II Ruckus II Ubiquiti II Aerohive I 
--- ---------------------- --- -Source: P roject Aspen, TRB Approval to Ne!,.:>tiate (A TN), Noven1ber 2014, p . 8 (AmbaAA0243444) . 
73. Note that while Aruba is labeled a leader in 13 of 16 categories, the 
WLAN companies selected by Dages are only leaders in 4 in the case of Aerohive, 
and 2 in the case of Ruckus and Ubiquiti. 
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74. The Company's leadership in these categories provided Aruba 
unmatched scalability in the industry. As HP's Antonio Neri noted in explaining 
why HP wanted to buy Aruba, "aside from Aruba, there is no other player in the 
market who can challenge them [Cisco] at scale in Campus (small fragmented 
player)."75 
75. Furthermore, the Forrester WA VE™ for WLAN Solutions report, 
cited in the Marcus Report, also placed Aruba in the "Leaders" category when 
assessing the Company on criteria such as scalability, security, market presence 
and strategy, among others.76 In addition, Gartner's 2015 Magic Quadrant report 
for wired and Wireless LAN positioned the Company in the "Leaders" category, a 
position rivaled only by Cisco and HP. These industry reports demonstrate their 
agreement with Aruba's market leadership position in numerous areas. In this case 
the analysis comparing Aruba to smaller, niche WLAN companies, such as those 
selected by Dages, provides limited utility in the determination of Aruba's fair 
value. 
76. Although these compames do have some things in common with 
Aruba, they are in very different positions in the marketplace and in their maturity. 
75 Email from Antonio Neri, "FW: Review ASPEN Business Plan/Operating 
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Interestingly, utilizing all of Dages's data and utilizing the median EBITDA 
multiple for just these WLAN companies, which are arguably the closest 
comparisons of Dages's group, and including a 20% premium to eliminate the 
minority interest discount inherent in Dages's analysis, implies a materially higher 
valuation for Aruba ranging from $23.70 - $ 46.30 per share (as compared to 
$11.55 to $21.75 per share in the Dages Report, Exhibit 8) as shown in the 
following table: 77 
EV /EBITDA 
LT\1 2015E 2016E 
Ruckus 34.4lx 43.19x 29.40x 
Ubiquiti 11.34x 11.73x 10.78x 
Aero hive 
Median 22.88x 27.46x 20.09x 
Mean 22.88x 27.46x 20.09x 
A mba Operating Figures $ 80.8 $ 132.5 $ 193.5 
Implied Enterprise Value 1,848.3 3,638.5 3,888.2 
Net Debt 291.0 291.0 291.0 
li11plied Equity Value 2,139.3 3,929.5 4,179.2 
Premium to Eliminate Minority Interest 20.00/o 20.0% 20.0% 
$ 2,567.2 $ 4,715.3 $ 5,015.1 
Shares Outstanding 108.32 108.32 108.32 
Equity Value per Share $ 23.70 $ 43.53 $ 46.30 
Note: (millions, except per share values). 
77 Dages calculates his "Comparable Company Valuation," presented as Exhibit 8 
of the Dages Report, using 108.32MM outstanding shares. He does not explain the 
basis for his calculation. If Dages's 108.32MM figure is replaced with the 
120.9MM fully diluted shares outstanding calculated in the Marcus Report, the 
LTM, 2015E and 2016E per share values would be $21.24, $39.01, and $41.49, 
respe,ctively. 
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77. The second category of comparable companies selected by Dages was 
Pure-·Play networking companies, which only included F5 Networks ("F5"). 
Again, this company's comparability to Aruba is limited. F5 primarily sells 
application delivery networking products that optimize the performance of an 
existing network's systems. Aruba does sell similar products, such as the Aruba 
7200 Series Mobility Controllers that optimize mobile application delivery, but 
these products are one of three major components Aruba sells.78 
78. In addition, F5 Networks was in a different stage of development than 
Aruba. For example, F5's revenues were growing at a slower rate than Aruba's, 
increasing at a compound annual rate of 15% over the period 2012-2014. Aruba's 
revenues grew approximately 23% over that same period, a rate nearly 50% higher 
than F5's. It is my opinion that F5 is not sufficiently comparable to Aruba for the 
purposes of a comparable company valuation. The table below summarizes 
revenue growth rates for F5 and other companies analyzed in further detail below: 
78 http://www.arubanetworks.com/products/networking/controllers/7200-series/; 
Aruba Networks [nc, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended July 31,2014, p.4. 
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Note: ( l) Represents the compound annual growth rate over the 3 year period 2011-2014. 
Source: FactSet. 
79. The Dages Report also ignores the other Pure-Play compames 
identified by the three financial advisors in the transaction (Arista Networks, 
Radware, and AlO Networks) and by doing so eliminated many of the highest 
multiple companies used in the bankers' valuation work. 
80. The final group of companies selected by Dages in his comparable 
company valuation was Traditional Networking companies. This includes Cisco 
Systems, Inc., Brocade Communications Systems, and Juniper Networks, Inc. 
These companies primarily focused on providing products and solutions for the 
more traditional wired networks, with products such as switches and routers. I do 
not consider these three companies to be comparable because the traditional 
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networking market was more mature than the fast growing WLAN market. This is 
clear when looking at revenue growth rates. Over the period 2012-2014, the three 
companies selected by Dages saw compound annual revenue growth ranging from 
1%-3%, while Aruba's revenues which grew at a rate of 23%. In addition, these 
three companies all employed debt in their capital structure, with debt to equity 
ratios ranging from 12%-15%. Aruba, on the other hand, had zero debt in its 
capital structure. 
81 . These compames, which are mature established businesses in the 
traditional networking market, have little in common with Aruba, but for the fact 
that a small fraction of these companies' current business was in the WLAN 
industry. In 2014 for example, Cisco's wireless segment had revenues of $2.3 
billion out of a total of$47.1 billion.79 Cisco is in a league of its own with a market 
capitalization of approximately $152 billion at the time of the merger. The breadth 
of its business and markets that it serves lead to risks in areas not experienced by 
Aruba. 
82. Brocade is a significant player in the fiber channel storage area 
networking ("SAN") business. The growth of cloud-based infrastructure and the 
shift of networking dollars to the cloud potentially threatens Brocade's cash-cow 
79 Cisco Systems Inc., Form 1 0-K for the fiscal year ended July 26, 2014, p. 120. 
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SAN business. 80 Despite a threat to its primary cash generating business unit, 
Brocade remained "committed to returning >60% of its FCF [free cash flow] to 
shareholders via buybacks/dividends." 81 It is clear that Brocade is a much more 
established company than Aruba. While Aruba was buying back stock to offset the 
dilutive effects of SBC82, I have not seen any evidence that the Company was 
going to be paying cash dividends to stockholders. As of the valuation date, the 
Company was in the process of shifting from a revenue-focused firm to increasing 
its profitability83, clearly putting it in a different phase of the business life cycle 
than Brocade. As such, Brocade is not a reasonable company to be used in valuing 
Aruba. 
83. Juniper is an established supplier of routers and switches for both 
internet service providers and enterprise network customers. Similar to Brocade, 
Juniper has a history of returning cash to shareholders in the form of dividends to 
stockholders, in addition to substantial stock buybacks. In 2015, cash dividend 
payments were expected to total more than $40 million per quarter.84 Again, while 
80 Wedbush Securities, "Brocade Communications (BRCD), IP Roars Ahead While 
SAN Stumbles, Maintain Neutral," May 21, 2015, p. 2. 
8 1 RBC Capital Markets, "Brocade Communications, Mixed results but giving 
more cash back," May 2, 2015, p. 1. 
82 See Galvin Dep. at 130. 
83 See Marcus Report at 18-21 and material cited therein. 
84 Juniper Networks, Inc., Form 10-Q for the Quarter ended March 31, 2015, p. 6. 
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Aruba was buying back stock, I have not seen any evidence to suggest that the 
Company was going to be paying cash dividends to stockholders. As such, it is 
clear that Juniper is in a different phase of the business life cycle than Aruba and, 
therefore, is not a reasonable company to be used in valuing Aruba. 
84. The EV /EBITDA multiple of these three (Cisco, Brocade and Juniper) 
mature businesses are the lowest three used by Dages. Removing them from his 
analysis, utilizing all of Dages's data, and including a 20% premium to eliminate 
the minority interest discount inherent in Dages's analysis yields a materially 
higher estimate of value, with estimates ranging from $16.14 to $46.30 per share 
(as compared to $11.55 to $21.75 per share in the Dages Report, Exhibit 8) as 
shown in the following table:85 
85 Again, Dages uses 108.32MM shares outstanding in his calculation. Dages 
Report, Exhibit 9. Using 120.9MM fully diluted shares outstanding as calculated 
in the Marcus Report, the LTM, 2015E and 2016E per share values would be 
$14.46, $20.67, and $41.49, respectively. 
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EV /EBITDA 
LTl\1 20l5E 20l6E 
Ruckus 34.4lx 43.19x 29.40x 
Ubiquiti 11.34x 11.73x 10.78x 
Aero hive 
FS Networks 14.43x 13.52x 
Median 14.43x 13.52x 20.09x 
Mean 20.06x 22.8lx 20.09x 
A mba Operating Figures $ 80.8 $ 132.5 $ 193.5 
Implied Enterprise Value 1,165.9 1,791.4 3,888.2 
Net Debt 291.0 291.0 291.0 
lnnplied Equity Value 1,456.9 2,082.4 4,179.2 
Premium to Eliminate Minority Interest 20.0% 20.0% 20.(Yl/o 
$ I ,748.3 $2,498.9 $5,015.1 
Shares Outstanding 108.32 108.32 108.32 
Equity Value per Share $ 16.14 $ 23.07 $ 46.30 
Note: (millions, except per share values). 
85. In addition to the factors showing the weakness of the comparability, 
the analysis focuses solely on Enterprise Value to EBITDA multiples while 
ignoring an Enterprise Value to Revenues multiple. While Aruba itself was 
transitioning from a focus on revenues to a focus on profits, that transformation 
had not been completed. The Q 1 2015 market response to a less than 1 o/o potential 
miss in its revenue guidance caused a 13.6% stock drop, which demonstrates the 
market's continued focus of Aruba's revenues. Furthermore, other WLAN 
companies used in the Dages comparable companies, none of which had Aruba's 
market leadership position or scale, would likely have been evaluated, in part, 
based on revenue multiples. Therefore, relying solely on EBITDA multiples for 
comparing to those companies is misleading. 
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86. Using the companies shown in the previous table as well as the 
Enterprise Value-to-Revenue multiples presented in the Marcus Report (since 
Dages did not compute revenue multiples) 86 , including a 20% premium to 
eliminate the minority interest discount inherent in Dages's analysis, but using all 
of Dages's other data, yields values that are $30.62, $31.67 and $32.55 per share 
based on LTM, and estimated 2015 and 2016 revenues, respectively, as set fmth in 
the following table:87 
E\' /Rcu~nuc 
LThl 2015E 2016E 
Ruckus 2.32x 2.09x 1.77x 
Ubiquiti 3.77x 3.80x 3.33x 
Aero hive 1.79x 1.62x 1.29x 
FSNetworks 4L62x 4.33x 3.88x 
2.55x I Median 3.04x 2.95x 
Mean 3.12x 2.96x 2.57x 
Aruba Operating Figures $ 812.4 $ 872.0 $ 1,038.0 
Itwlied Enterprise Value 2,472.9 2,568.0 2,646.9 
Net Debt 291.0 291.0 291.0 
Implied Equity Value 2,763.9 2,859.0 2,937.9 
Premium to Eliminate Minority Interes t 20.00/o 20.0% 20.00/o 
$ 3,316.6 $ 3,430.8 $ 3,525.5 
Shares Outstanding 108.32 108.32 108.32 
Equity Value per Share $ 30.62 $ 31 .67 $ 32.55 
Note: (millions, except per share values). 
86 Marcus Report at Exhibit 8-2. Note that the Marcus Report did not include LTM 
Revenue multiples. The L TM Revenue multiples shown in this table were 
calculated in the same manner as the 20 15E and 20 16E multiples. 
87 Again, if Dages's 108.32MM shares outstanding is replaced with the 120.9MM 
fully diluted shares outstanding calculated in the Marcus Report, the LTM, 2015E 
and 2016E per share values would be $27.44, $28.38 and $29.17, respectively. 
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87. Based on the foregoing, I do not believe Dages 's comparable 
company analysis supports his valuation of Aruba at $ 19.85 per share. 
E. COMPARABLE TRANSACTION ANALYSIS 
88. Unlike the Dages Report's Comparable Company Analysis that 
valued Aruba using the Company's latest twelve months ("LTM"), CY 2015E and 
CY 2016E EBITDA, Dages' s Comparable Transaction Analysis only uses Aruba' s 
LTM EBITDA.88 As discussed in my opening report, at the time of the valuation 
date, Aruba was in the midst of shifting from a revenue-focused company to one of 
generating profits. Aruba' s value relies more on its expected future perfmmance 
than on its past EBITDA performance. As such, Dages's Comparable Transaction 
Analysis is irrelevant. 
89. Putting aside the fact that this methodology solely relies on Aruba' s 
L TM EBITDA, the Dages Report notes that the Comparable Transaction Analysis 
is "highly dependent on finding transactions where the acquired company is 
sufficiently comparable to the company being valued. " 89 In deriving his list of 
"sufficiently" comparable transactions, Dages used Capital IQ to search for 
transactions that were greater than $1 billion and that occurred over the ten-year 
88 Dages Report at Exhibit 10. 
89 Dages Report at 36. 
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period preceding the Aruba transaction.90 Additionally, the target companies had to 
be located in the United States or Canada, operating in the same three SIC codes 
that he used in his comparable companies analysis.91 This process resulted in 36 
potentially comparable transactions. Dages then selected the median EBITDA 
multiple of those deals to value Aruba (again, using LTM EBITDA data).92 
90. There are two primary issues with this analysis: (1) the time period 
analyzed is not appropriate and (2) Dages uses a rote approach to identify 
potentially comparable transactions. 
91. Concerning the time period analyzed, Dages looks at transactions 
taking place in the previous 10 years. This is not appropriate given the 
transformative changes that Aruba has experienced in the prior five years. 
Therefore, utilizing transactions from more than 5 years ago is not a meaningful 
exercise. Limiting Dages's results to only transactions that occurred in the five 
years leading up to the Aruba transaction reduces his sample from 36 to 16 
transactions. 
92. The problem with usmg this rote approach is that it relies on 
transactions identified solely by SIC codes, without rev1ewmg the target 
90 Dages Report at 36 and Exhibit 9. 
91 Dages Report at 36. 
92 Dages Report at 36 and Exhibits 9 and 10. 
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companies' underlying business, and therefore irrelevant transactions get included 
in the analysis. As noted jn the Marcus Report, using FactSet, I identified 
approximately 70 potential comparable precedent transactions and narrowed the 
list of comparable transactions down to 30. Of this group, I was not able to 
determine sufficient comparability between this group of companies and Aruba. 
93. The Dages Report does not indicate that he performed any analysis of 
the identified target companies' businesses in order to determine if those 
transactions were "sufficiently comparable" to Aruba. 
94. The following table shows a summary of transaction targets I do not 
consider comparable to Aruba, but which nevertheless are included in Dages's 
comparable transactions analysis. This analysis was limited to only those 
transactions which closed within five years preceding the closing of the Aruba 
transaction. 93 As seen below, numerous target companies are not "sufficiently 
comparable" 94 to be useful in determining the Company's fair value: 
93 Based on the actual closing dates and not the erroneous dates repmied in the 
Dages Report, Exhibit 9. 
94 Dages Report at 36. 
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I .trg.:t Natn.: Bus mess (I) 
Fund tech Corp. (GfCR LLC) 
Sapient Corp. 
MICROS Systems, Inc. 
Open Table, Inc. 
Fieldglass, Inc. (Madison Dearborn Partners) 
Sourcefire, Inc. 
Sunquest Infomntion Systems, lnc. 
Radiant Systems, Inc. 




Software a.nd services for the Financial industry 
Consuhantcy & nJat~ting services 
Manufacturing infonnation solutions for the 
hospitality and retail industries 
Online reservation-taking services for restaurants 
Human capital management 
(..'yber security solutions 
laboratory software 
Hardware/Software for POS systems 
Mobile network technology solutions 
Performance management software 
IT services 
(1) This is a short description of the target's bus u1ess. A more conprehensive description can be found in 
Exhibit 3. 
95_ None of the targets included in Dages's comparable transactions 
analysis have any substantial business in the enterprise WLAN market Many of 
the targets listed only provide software or services, which require a substantially 
different business model than that of Aruba's, which manufactures and sells 
enterprise grade WLAN equipment 
96. In conclusion, Dages inappropriately uses a 1 0-year period in his 
analysis, which is too long to provide meaningful valuation information and 
includes numerous companies that are insufficiently comparable to Aruba to be 
used in a comparable transaction valuation. Due to the numerous erroneous inputs 
to Dages's analysis, the Dages Report's comparable transaction analysis cannot be 
relied upon to provide an indication of Aruba's fair value. 
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V. LIMITING FACTORS AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS 
97. In accordance with recognized professional ethics, my professional 
fees for this service are not contingent upon the opinion expressed herein, and I do 
not have a present or intended financial interest in the outcome of this matter. 
98. Public information, statistical information and data are from sources I 
deem to be reliable. However, I make no representation as to the accuracy or 
completeness of such information and data. 
99. It should be understood that I have reviewed numerous documents 
related to this matter and I have set forth in this repmt only a summary of the 
testimony I expect to provide at triaL I have not attempted to set forth verbatim 
every fact that supports my opinion. I reserve the right to supplement or amend this 
report should any additional information become available. 
Dated: September 2, 2016 
Paul A. Marcus, CF A, CFE 
PM Financial Expert Consultants, LLC 
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